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The Counterproductive Bush Administration
Policy Toward the International Criminal Court
Anne K. Heindel
Despite a long history of U.S. leadership in promoting international
justice mechanisms, the Bush administration terminated all U.S.
participation in the formation of the International Criminal Court (ICC or
Court) shortly after taking office. Like the current administration, the
Clinton administration was critical of the ICC and never supported
immediate U.S. membership. However, while the Clinton administration
believed that American concerns could be effectively addressed by
remaining engaged in the process of building the Court, the Bush
administration instead directs its efforts at preventing the Court’s effective
operation. This policy has caused acrimony between the United States and
many of its closest allies and is repeatedly invoked as an example of
strident American unilateralism. It has also become a flash point for those
who oppose U.S. commitments and obligations to international institutions.
Unfortunately, the intensity of feeling surrounding the Court in the
United States has not led to trenchant discussion, but has instead turned the
ICC into a powerful but largely unexamined symbol. For some, U.S. policy
toward it conjures up the menace of American hegemony; for others, it
represents a welcome repudiation of constraints on American sovereignty.
Nonetheless, despite the fact that the Court is now poised to begin its first
investigations, so far there has been no real exchange of views on how the
U.S. should address the Court’s existence.
Consequently, most Americans have never heard of the ICC, and those
who have are much more likely to be familiar with the views of the
administration.1 Nevertheless, in polls over the past several years, around
65 percent of Americans have consistently supported U.S. participation in
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the ICC when its purpose and aims are explained to them, even when the
administration’s concerns are identified.2 Despite serious questions about
how the Court will work in practice, Americans see potential benefits from
the Court to the United States in decreasing the likelihood of war, lessening
the global police burden on the United States, preventing atrocities, and
providing justice to victims.3
These kinds of benefits do not accrue immediately, but build over time.
For this reason it will be years before the Court’s record of
accomplishments can be meaningfully evaluated. But those in the
administration leading the charge against the Court are not willing to wait.
They are not willing even to keep a watchful eye on the Court to see
whether or not it can grow into a respected and effective institution. They
are ideologically opposed to its very existence and—at more cost to U.S.
influence and credibility than to the Court—are doing their best to see that
it fails in its mission.
This article argues that the Bush administration’s ICC policy is not only
needlessly hostile, but also impedes U.S. foreign policy goals, which would
be best served by a more pragmatic approach toward the Court. It looks at
the benefits the ICC can bring to efforts to promote peace and the rule of
law, as well as to specific U.S. interests. It examines the administration’s
objections and the ideology behind its campaign against the Court, and
argues that the current policy is in fact counterproductive to U.S. national
interests. It concludes with a discussion of ways in which the United States
could work cooperatively with the Court to address its concerns.

I. THE ORIGIN AND OPERATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT
The desire to prevent the repetition of the horrors of World War II led to
a rapid criminalization of human rights violations as expressed in treaties
such as the Genocide Convention4 and the Geneva Conventions.5 It was
hoped that the promotion of universal individual accountability for atrocity
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crimes6 would provide a firm basis on which states could act to prevent a
new “Hitler” from carrying out a policy of systematic human rights
violations.
The U.S.-backed trials of the Nazi leadership at Nuremberg provided a
model for and the impetus to create a permanent court to implement this
newly codified law. Consequently, the Genocide Convention, the first
human rights treaty promulgated by the United Nations, envisioned the
creation of an international court to try persons accused of this new crime.7
Accordingly, in its resolution approving the convention, the General
Assembly asked the International Law Commission to study the desirability
and possibility of creating such a tribunal.8
Despite the Commission’s conclusion that an international court was
both desirable and possible and the General Assembly’s periodic
reconsideration of the issue, the tensions of the Cold War prevented the
proposal from moving forward for fifty years. In the meantime, sustained
efforts went into promoting the acceptance of stricter human rights
standards. Additional landmark treaties came into force, including the
Torture Convention,9 the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment
of the Crime of Apartheid,10 and the Geneva Convention’s Optional
Protocols.11 It was not until the ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia
and the genocide in Rwanda in the early 1990s—and the creation by the
Security Council of ad hoc courts to try the perpetrators of those
atrocities12—that nations found the will to begin building a permanent court
with the capacity try persons who devise such crimes.
On July 1, 2002, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court13
came into force, giving jurisdiction to the Court to try individuals for the
most serious international crimes: genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity. As of May 2004, the Statute had ninety-four states parties.14
Many commentators believe that the establishment of the Court is no less
important than the adoption of the United Nations Charter itself. Its
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creation was hailed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as “a giant step
forward in the march toward universal human rights and the rule of law.”15
A. ICC Jurisdiction
The ICC is a permanent and highly specialized court. It is not a United
Nations body. It can only investigate individuals, not states or
corporations.16 Absent Security Council authorization, the Court is
restricted by its Statute to investigating two types of situations: (1) crimes
occurring in the territory of a state that is either a party to the Rome Statute
or accepts the Court’s jurisdiction, and (2) crimes committed by the
national of a state party.17 For example, because the United Kingdom is a
state party, the Court may investigate UK citizens no matter where in the
world they commit their crimes. Alternatively, the Court may investigate
anyone who commits an ICC crime in the UK, including citizens of nonstate parties like the United States.
In addition to the need for a state to consent to ICC jurisdiction, there are
two other major limitations on the Court’s authority: the types of crimes it
may pursue and its obligation to defer to national criminal jurisdictions.
First, the Court may only exercise jurisdiction over “the most serious
crimes of international concern.”18 Therefore, not only is the ICC restricted
to examining atrocity crimes, it is directed to adjudicate only those that are
planned, systematic, or occur on a large scale.19 For this reason, the Office
of the Prosecutor will not investigate all war crimes, but only those that are
committed intentionally,20 and for the most part, as part of an organizational
or government policy.21 It will likewise pursue only those persons who
bear the greatest responsibility for such crimes.22 The drafters of the Rome
Statute established this high threshold to ensure that the Court would only
investigate and try individuals whose actions are without a doubt massive,
calculated, and consequently, of grave concern internationally.
Second, the Court’s jurisdiction is complementary to national criminal
jurisdiction and was never intended to be applicable in all situations.23 It is
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a court of last resort that can only operate when a state with jurisdiction
cannot or will not act.24 This may occur when a state has become so
lawless that it no longer has a functioning justice system.25 Alternatively, it
may occur when those in charge prevent an investigation or rig the results
of a trial.26 However, when a case is being genuinely investigated or
prosecuted by a national body, the ICC cannot proceed with its review.27
Furthermore, if a case has been investigated in good faith by a national
authority, and that authority has decided not to prosecute, the ICC still
cannot take up the investigation.28 For this reason, the Court is both fully
compatible with and supportive of domestic criminal investigations. The
Court is not designed to occupy the field, but to fill the gaps to ensure that
those most reponsible for atrocity crimes will not avoid accountabilty.
B. Start Up of the Court
Despite continuing U.S. opposition to the Court, in the year 2003 the
ICC’s eighteen judges and its prosecutor were elected and sworn into
office. As of January 2004, the prosecutor had received over 700
communications from individuals, non-governmental organizations,
victims, and states.29 Many of these did not provide specific information
about a criminal situation. Many more fell outside the jurisdiction of the
Court because, for example, they provided evidence of a crime of
aggression (that is, the crime of illegally inititing an armed conflict), which
is not yet within the mandate of the Court because an agreement on its
definition has not been reached.30 Other communications fell outside the
Court’s jurisdiction because they occurred before the Court’s temporal
jurisdiction began on July 1, 2002.31 Finally, many communications were
rejected because they did not occur in the territory of a state party and were
not committed by the national of a state party. Such inapplicable situations
included allegations about the behavior of U.S. forces in Iraq.32
The prosecutor is at present evaluating whether his office should begin
formal investigations into two situations.33 The first is in the Ituri region of
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the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where despite an ongoing peace
process to end its six-year war, thousands of civilians continue to be
targeted for execution, torture, abduction and rape. The second is in the
northern region of Uganda, where the Lord’s Resistance Army (a rebel
group made up primarily of abducted child soldiers), and some government
forces have been accused of committing systematic atrocities against
civilians during an 18-year conflict. Both countries are ICC state parties
whose governments have referred these situations to the Court. The
prosecutor is expected to announce as early as June 2004 his decision to
undertake both investigations.

II. THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Despite the existence of numerous treaties prohibiting mass atrocity
crimes, without consistent enforcement it has been impossible to either
deter or punish those responsible. History shows that domestic courts are
frequently unable or unwilling to tackle these types of crimes, especially
when they involve powerful government officials. This is because
atrocities often arise out of the disintegration state institutions of law and
order.
Moreover, war-torn countries cannot rely on the mere “good will” of the
big powers, including the United States, to help them seek justice. The
political will and financial resources simply do not exist to strengthen or
rebuild national courts—or to set up special courts—each time they are
needed.34 Nor is the creation of more ad hoc tribunals by the Security
Council a practical alternative. It is often said that the Council has “tribunal
fatigue”35—a reality that impelled the creation of the ICC in the first place.
Even with international assistance, states that are technically able to try
offenders sometimes prefer not to do so. For example, in expressing his
country’s support for the establishment of the ICC, the Deputy Permanent
Representative of Sierra Leone to the UN said:
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[t]he point here is that if the International Criminal Court had
begun to function, Sierra Leone would not have requested the
setting up of a Special Court. The perpetrators of those heinous
crimes committed in my country would have been handed to the
Jurisdiction of the Court.36
No one doubts that domestic trials are the best way of addressing these
situations. The ICC prosecutor has said that “[n]ational investigations and
prosecutions, where they can be properly undertaken, will normally be the
most effective and efficient means of bringing offenders to justice; States
themselves will normally have the best access to evidence and witnesses.”37
For this reason, he has said that “the absence of trials by the ICC as a
consequence of effective functioning of national systems would be a major
success.”38 This is the ideal. But no one seriously believes that the ICC
will have no work to do.
A. Benefits of a “Court of Last Resort”
Most of history’s worst killers have been individuals whose monopoly of
state political and coersive authority has placed them above the law. The
ICC, as a permanent international court with the mandate to prosecute such
persons, will help to close this impunity gap. Trials are not a panacea. For
instance, no criminal justice system can deal effectively or efficiently with
large numbers of culpable individuals. But, trials of the upper echelon are
an essential component of community reconciliation. Holding them to
account discredits their entire criminal enterprise from top to bottom. In
discussing the advantages of prosecutions, Alex Boraine, Deputy
Chairperson of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
has pointed out that “prosecution establishes . . . that perpetrators cannot be
allowed to get away with their actions, that there is a price to be paid, and
that is not only fair but right that accounts must be settled.”39
Trials of leaders who plan and foment mass atrocities can thus promote
closure. Working alongside national and regional courts and truth
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commissions, they can provide a forum for a community to acknowledge
and condemn the suffering of victims and survivors, and for victims to tell
their stories and have it mean something, to have it be part of a reckoning.
Such stories create a collective historical record of past events that help a
community to stop denying the past and begin building a stable future.
Trials can also help start building the conditions under which the rule of
law will be respected and thus help prevent a return to conflict. For
instance, if amnesties are easily and widely granted, they will not be
perceived as a process ending the violence but as a free pass to continue it.
Moreover, international trials provide an opportunity for the international
community to facilitate the rebuilding of local legal systems so that lowerlevel offenders can also be held accountable. Trials of those who plan
atrocities can furthermore counter attempts to blame nations or ethnic,
religious, or other groups as a whole for the crimes of individuals. This is
the kind of cyclical violence witnessed in Yugoslavia, where brutality was
encouraged through references to unresolved prior conflicts.
Finally, trials can isolate and incapacitate criminal leaders so that they
can be removed from active political participation. For instance, the
transfer of Slobodan Milosevic from Serbia to the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia has provided some much needed breathing space
for its fragile democracy to take root. Even if tyrants cannot be
immediately brought to justice because they remain securely in power, their
mere indictment may benefit the promotion of long-term peace. For
instance, if Saddam Hussein had been charged by an international court
after his genocide against the Kurds in 1988, he would likely have lost both
domestic and international legitimacy. Many Iraqis might have turned
against him as they did when he appeared weak in 1991. And countries
such as the United States would not have been able or willing to continue
working with him as long as they did. Perhaps both Gulf wars could then
have been averted.

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS & U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

The Counterproductive Bush Administration Policy Toward the ICC 353

B. Benefits from the Mere Existence of the ICC
It is often noted that the creation of the ICC has advanced the rule of law
whether or not the Court ever takes a case. The existence of the Court is
educating people around the world about international justice and
encouraging their resolve that such crimes must be punished, whether by
the ICC or in their own courts. The growing belief that there is no
sovereign or security justification for mass crimes, combined with the need
and desire of states to cooperate with the Court and to prosecute ICC crimes
themselves, is leading states to amend their criminal codes to include
substantive and procedural law compatible to the Rome Statute.40 The mere
establishment of the ICC is thus promoting adherence to the Statute’s high
legal standards. This in turn will assist the promotion of democracy and the
amelioraton of lawless and chaotic conditions that incubate terrorism and
other global threats.

III. U.S. INTERESTS ALIGNED WITH PARTICIPATION IN THE COURT
In addition to its inherent value in promoting the rule of law, peace,
accountability, and justice for victims, the ICC can directly benefit the
United States. The Court will serve U.S. national interests in protecting
American servicemembers, furthering U.S. policy objectives, and
maintaining U.S. leadership in the development of international law.
A. Benefits to the American Military
Opponents of the ICC often say that the United States has more to fear
from the Court than other countries because its military is deployed more
widely around the globe and therefore is especially vulnerable to politically
motivated prosecutions. However, it is exactly because the U.S. armed
forces are continuously involved in conflicts that they can uniquely benefit
from increased enforcement of international humanitarian law. Welldeveloped standards for war crimes prosecutions are not a danger to the
U.S. military, which is extremely serious and diligent about incorporating
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legal considerations into its operations. General Wesley Clark has
commented:
I was subject to a war crimes investigation in my role as NATO
commander. It didn’t bother me a bit. We had a full integration of
lawyers in all of our activities. We never did anything that was the
remotest bit beyond the shade of the law. We would never want to
do that.41
On the other hand, many of the groups the U.S. military confronts do not
apply the rules of war to the same degree. By promoting widespread
adherence to the same legal standards followed by the U.S. military, the
ICC will help protect American servicemembers from inhumane conduct on
the battlefield, and also from abuse if they become prisoners of war.
Moreover, leaders such as Saddam Hussein, who commit mass human
rights violations against their own citizens, often go on to cause regional
instability and use illegal methods to conduct their wars. As discussed
above, the ICC can help rein in such leaders by undercutting their
legitimacy, thus preventing wars that result in the deaths of American
soldiers.
B. Benefits for the Promotion of U.S. Policy Objectives
The United States could also benefit from involvement in the ICC if it
made good use of its unique ability to influence the Court’s agenda. If it
were to work with the Court on common objectives by sharing information
about atrocity crimes, providing political support, and offering material
assistance, the ICC could be a vehicle for U.S. efforts to promote the rule of
law and democratic governance. The ICC’s governing body, the Assembly
of States Parties (ASP) (where the United States is presently entitled to
participate as an observer42) provides a ready-made forum for the United
States to build legitimacy and credibility for its foreign policy objectives.
For example, if in the future the United States wanted to encourage “regime
change” in a “rogue” nation, it could supply evidence of atrocities to the
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prosecutor, and begin to build an international consensus recognizing and
supporting the legitimacy of its goal. In the same way, the United States
could work with the Court to pursue those responsible for mass terrorist
crimes.
Although the United States has the military capability to act alone, now
more than ever it is apparent that it needs international support to win its
political battles.43 In the past the United States derived great influence from
its ability to provide leadership in the United Nations. It could benefit in
the same way from participation in the ASP.
C. Benefits in Maintaining U.S. Influence over Developing International
Criminal Law Standards
A U.S. presence at the ASP would ensure that the United States
continues to hold sway over developing international standards. The ICC
now exists as a permanent Court of which close to half the world’s states
are members. Most other states participate in its work. For this reason, the
Court will inevitably become the central forum where international criminal
law is refined and developed. To maintain its leadership in this field, the
United States has an interest in participating in meetings of the ASP.
For example, any member of the United Nations can take part in the
ongoing attempts to define the crime of aggression. U.S. views on this
topic carry great weight. It is also obviously an issue of tremendous
importance to the United States, as evidenced by the fact that it was one of
only two working groups to which the Bush administration sent delegates
before withdrawing entirely from the ICC negotiations. Good faith and
constructive participation by the United States at meetings of the aggression
committee would go a long way toward ensuring that its continuing
concerns on this topic are heard and addressed.
Participation in the ASP is also important for continued U.S. influence in
the evolution of the law of war. It is vital to U.S. interests that the
jurisprudence of the Rome Statute remains compatible with U.S. military
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views and standards. This will be of particular concern as the 2009 review
conference approaches,44 which will provide the first opportunity for ASP
members to amend the Rome Statute.

IV. U.S. OPPOSITION TO THE ICC
ICC opponents in the government either do not believe that the Court can
provide benefits to the United States or believe that they are substantially
outweighed by the costs. This skeptical attitude is a new position for the
United States, and is no longer confined to the ICC.45 In the past, the U.S.
government was the primary proponent of efforts to achieve international
justice through trials. It was an early advocate of the Nuremberg Tribunal,
the ad hoc courts for Rwanda and Yugoslavia, and (at first) a permanent
international criminal court.46
In fact, the Clinton administration made major contributions to the
development of the ICC. For example, it pressed for the inclusion in the
Rome Statute of crimes committed during internal armed conflicts. It also
took the initiative in drafting a code that explains the precise actions and
intent that must be proved for each of the crimes in the Statute.47 This
document was drafted primarily by the U.S. delegation48 and was approved
by the Defense Department.49
However, the Clinton administration, like the current administration,
never supported U.S. ratification of the Court’s Rome Statute. From the
beginning, it sought formal control over the ICC to ensure that no American
would ever come before it. Its primary concern, originating in the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, was that the Court would be used politically to target
Americans generally, and servicemembers in particular. For this reason,
during negotiations the Clinton administration argued that the UN Security
Council should have the exclusive authority to approve the referral of most
situations50 and contended that the Court should only be able to try the
nationals of a state party.51
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Other states rejected these demands because they wanted the Court to be
independent from political pressures. Also, a primary reason for the
creation of the Court was to ensure that all persons accused of committing
atrocity crimes would be treated equally, regardless of their nationality or
political position.52 Nevertheless, U.S. concerns were addressed through
compromise solutions, most importantly including the decision to design
the Court to complement and not preempt domestic courts. A seven-year
opt out was also provided for so that states with active militaries could join
the Court without immediately subjecting their troops to the Court’s war
crimes jurisdiction.53 Moreover, the drafters intentionally did not reserve
the Office of the Prosecutor for individuals from state parties in the
expectation that an American prosecutor could act as a bridge to full U.S.
participation in the Court.54
These compromises were not enough to override U.S. concerns, which
have only increased with the change in administration. The most frequently
recited objection to the Court by the U.S. government continues to be that
the Court will act politically against the United States. Other often
mentioned criticisms include perceived infringement of U.S. sovereignty
because it is possible for an American to be brought before the Court
without United States consent, the fear of an “unaccountable” prosecutor,
and a belief that the law the Court will apply is “vague.” Standing above all
of these concerns, but also partially underlying them, is an ideological
opposition to the Court deeply rooted in American exceptionalism. Each of
these objections will be addressed in turn.
A. Fear of Politically Motivated Prosecutions
The core argument raised by opponents is the fear that the Court will be
politically motivated against U.S. officials and servicemembers. Connected
with this is the concern that the Court’s indictments will second-guess U.S.
foreign policy decisions and put a chilling effect on the United States’
ability to take action around the world. Underlying much of this concern is
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the independence of the Court from Security Council oversight, and
therefore from the power of the United States in the Council.
There is no simple answer for these serious and important apprehensions.
The Court is just now getting started and has no record of fair adjudication
to which to point. It is only possible to highlight the stellar credentials and
reputations of the Court’s new judges, the long experience and excellent
record of its prosecutor,55 and the fact that the Court’s first investigations
demonstrate that it is thus far functioning as intended.
Nevertheless, there cannot be an absolute immunity from the Court’s
jurisdiction for American nationals. That would violate the equal
application of the law and the sovereign rights of states to exercise their
criminal enforcement powers jointly through the Court. Instead of
providing a blanket exemption for Americans, the Statute includes
interacting checks and balances that severely limit the Court’s power and
effectively safeguard against political prosecutions.
For example, since the Court can only investigate a few kinds of crimes
with an extremely high threshold of gravity, it will not be able to pursue
U.S. officials or servicemembers for negligent or isolated criminal acts.
The Court has jurisdiction over individuals who orchestrate mass atrocities,
such as Pol Pot and Osama bin Laden, not over ordinary soldiers who make
mistakes in the heat of battle. It is also not a political forum for airing
criticisms of U.S. policy,56 but a court of law that can only try individuals
for whom there is proof that they have deliberately intended to cause or
commit atrocities.
Moreover, the Court is monitored and controlled by its governing body,
the Assembly of States Parties. The ASP represents member states57 and,
by its very nature, is made up of countries committed to the principles of
transparency and democracy. Dictators and tyrants will not want to make
their actions accountable to the ICC by joining the Court. Ratifying states
are primarily U.S. friends and allies whose interests would not be served by
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unfair prosecution of Americans, and do not include “rogue” states seeking
to further their own political agendas. 58
The primary safeguard against politically motivated prosecutions is the
principle of complementarity in the very foundation of the Court. In
practice, this means that the ICC must defer to domestic investigations and
courts whenever a state has a functioning legal system and acts “genuinely”
to investigate or prosecute.59 Thus, the United States, even as a non-party
state, has the right to take over any investigation of a U.S. national and
remove it from the Court’s jurisdiction.
Critics argue that ICC judges will be capricious in determining the
genuineness of national proceedings.60 The Statute does not address this
concern in great detail, but provides two important standards that must
guide the Court’s considerations. It says that in determining unwillingness,
the Court shall make reference to “the principles of due process recognized
by international law.”61 It also makes the demonstration of an intent to
obstruct justice a requirement of showing “unwillingness.”62
It is extremely unlikely that a country with a legal system as professional
and respected as that of the United States would be accused of inadequate
proceedings unless there was actual evidence of corruption in a specific
case. This view is supported by remarks made by Judge Philippe Kirsch,
the President of the ICC. In discussing complementarity, he said:
In the case of democratic countries that have systems that function
perfectly well, there is no reason why any issue should come
before the ICC, because . . . a determination of how a proceeding
is conducted does not depend on its outcomes. It does not require
a prosecution. It could require an acquittal or even a decision not
to prosecute. All that is required is that proceedings are conducted
normally.63
Ultimately, if a misuse of power occurs and remains unchecked, the ICC
itself will lose its greatest asset: its appearance of impartiality. A young
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court with no independent enforcement powers would not survive long
under these circumstances.
B. Sovereignty Concerns
The second major U.S. government objection is that the Court is capable
of investigating and trying Americans without U.S. acquiescence.
However, the Court does not, as is commonly claimed, have jurisdiction
over non- state parties. The Court does not have jurisdiction over states or
governments at all, but only over individuals. States have no obligation to
cooperate with the Court unless they have chosen to exercise their
sovereignty by ratifying the Statute or by accepting its jurisdiction over a
particular criminal situation. Thus, until the United States chooses to ratify
the Statute, the Court will not be able to reach or prosecute accused persons
who remain in the United States, and the United States does not have to
make them available to the Court.
Sovereignty concerns sometimes arise from a misunderstanding about the
ICC’s jurisdictional reach. Unlike ad hoc tribunals, the Court’s jurisdiction
is not limited to crimes occurring in any particular territory; nonetheless the
ICC does not have global or “universal” jurisdiction.64 The Court may only
examine crimes that are committed by a national of a state party or which
occur within a state party’s territory.65 These are the two most traditional
bases of jurisdiction, not a legal innovation. For example, it has always
been the case that if an American commits a crime in the United Kingdom,
the UK can try him or her under UK law and procedure. Its right to do so is
incontestable under U.S. and international law.66 Now that the ICC is at
work, the UK may instead choose to defer to an ICC investigation. Like all
other member states, the UK has made a sovereign decision to share with
the ICC its jurisdiction over especially grave international crimes.
Consequently, the Court has no more power to try U.S. nationals, or anyone
else, than that already possessed by its constituent members pursuant to
well-established law.
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C. “Accountability” Concerns
Another criticism often raised is that the Court, and especially the
prosecutor, is “unaccountable.”67 It is argued that, because the Court is not
integrated into a legal and governance system that includes an executive
and a legislature, it has a “democratic deficit” and therefore lacks
accountability.68 This argument disregards the governing and monitoring of
the Court by the ASP, a body made up of member state representatives.
ASP oversight responsibilities include hiring and firing the judges and the
prosecutor, controlling the Court’s budget, and amending the Rome Statute
when necessary. This criticism also ignores the right of the Security
Council to prevent or suspend an investigation or prosecution for a year
when it would conflict with the maintenance of peace and security.69
Regarding the powers of the prosecutor in particular, there are a number
of safeguards in the Statute that ensure his accontability. For instance,
while he can evaluate complaints at his desk using information he receives
from any source,70 he can only initiate an investigation on that basis if, after
reviewing his presentation of the supporting material, the pre-trial chamber
concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed.71 The prosecutor also
must immediately notify a state if one of its nationals is under
investigation.72 Both the state and the accused can then challenge both the
jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the crime.73 A state can
also decide to conduct its own investigation and ask the prosecutor to defer
his inquiry.74 Finally, if the prosecutor or any other Court official is found
to have acted improperly, the ASP may remove him or her from office.75
D. Concern That the Standards the ICC Will Apply Are “Vague”
Some opponents raise the specter of foreign judges with different cultural
values and legal systems applying a vague body of war crimes law
unacceptable to the United States.76 This criticism is entirely unfounded.
First, the jurisprudence of the Court is based on well-established treaty law
developed over the past fifty years, which the United States accepts.
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Second, as previously discussed, the U.S. delegation had a major hand in
drafting the war crimes provisions and led the effort to draft the Elements
of Crimes, which defines the specific acts and intent required for
prosecution of each charge.77 Third, the United States twice during ICC
negotiations joined on instructions in consensus votes adopting the sections
of the Rome Statute containing the jurisprudence of the Court. Finally, the
United States recently incorporated that very same jurisprudence—taken
almost verbatim from the ICC Statute—into the new Statute of the Iraqi
Special Tribunal,78 which was signed into law by Ambassador Paul Bremer
on behalf of the Coalition Provisional Authority in December 2003.
Clearly, this action demonstrates that the Bush administration has no
serious objections to the law the Court will apply and in fact considers it to
be a reliable restatement of the current status of international law in a form
suitable for use by a tribunal.
E. Ideological Opposition to the Court
Although some members of the government may be worried that they or
other Americans will be vulnerable to prosecution by the Court,
administration objections do not, for the most part, stem from genuine fears
about the vulnerability of individual American servicemembers or officials.
They primarily originate in a concern that the Court is independent from
existing political constraints and may interfere with the U.S. ability to act.
This perception originates in a belief that the U.S. government should be
free to take whatever actions it believes are necessary to preserve and
project its power. In doing so, opponents believe that the United States
government should be able at will to work with whomever it wants without
being potentially subject to allegations that its policies are either connected
with atrocities in other countries or to questions about why it is doing
nothing to stop them.
Court opponents are primarily motivated by two different but
overlapping perspectives on this point. Each has, at its foundation, a deeply
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rooted suspicion of international institutions. The first is characterized by
the aggressively ideological stance taken by the head of the administration’s
ICC policy team, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security John Bolton. His vehemence toward the Court stems
from his conviction that it is a threat “to the independence and flexibility
that America’s military forces need to defend U.S. national interests around
the world.”79 In his view, international law is not law at all80 because it is
not part of “a coherent ‘constitutional’ design,”81 and also because (contrary
to U.S. legal precedent82) he does not believe that it is binding on the
United States under the U.S. Constitution.83 For this reason, he sees the
promotion of international law and the ICC as “a stealth approach to erode
[U.S.] constitutionalism”84 and a strategy to assert supremacy over the
United States.85 His dominance over U.S. policy towards the ICC is the
primary reason the anti-ICC campaign has remained largely unmediated by
its real-world effects on American interests.
The second approach runs parallel with the first but is rooted in realist
notions of maintaining and projecting American power that recognizes the
value of multilateral relations and institutions. Therefore, while this group
of opponents is equally concerned about the impact of the ICC on the
preeminence of the U.S. Constitution and on U.S. discretion to act, it
acknowledges and is concerned about the international perception and
consequences of the U.S. campaign against the Court. A prime example of
this group is Senator Robert Bennett, who felt compelled to explain his
uneasiness with the Court in response to “angst among our friends and
allies around the world.”86 After a long critique of the Court and its
inferiority to the U.S. constitutional model, he stated that he nevertheless
believes “the United States should stay engaged and involved in discussions
about [the Court]” and does not think that “we should turn our backs and
walk away and say we will never have anything to do with it or be involved
in it.”87
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There are many serious and genuinely felt concerns about the Court. It is
a new and unknown institution. The U.S. government’s hesitancy to join
the Court is in line with a long history of U.S. wariness toward international
entanglements. It is not unexpected that a country that took forty years to
join the Genocide Convention would not be a founding member of the first
permanent international criminal court able to prosecute that crime. As
with previous international developments, one would expect the United
States to bide its time, keep an eye on the Court, and do what it can to
ensure that the Court acts appropriately. Instead, the Bush administration’s
ideological obsessions are driving a war on the ICC that is endangering
U.S. interests around the world.

V. CURRENT U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE COURT
Despite their similar reluctance to accept an independent ICC, the
Clinton and Bush administrations’ respective approaches toward the Court
have been vastly different. The Clinton administration was somewhat welldisposed toward the Court. It participated fully in all negotiating sessions
and signed the Rome Statute at the last possible date in an effort to retain
U.S. influence over the final completion of the Court.88 Nevertheless,
President Clinton also recommended that his successor not ratify the treaty,
which he called “flawed.”89 The Bush administration, however, has from
the beginning taken a much more absolute stance. It completely cut off all
negotiations regarding the Court shortly after taking office, nullified the
Clinton administration’s signature on the Statute in May 2002, and for two
years has conducted an active campaign to undermine the Court.
Bush administration officials have often said that they respect the rights
of other states to be a party to the ICC and merely want their decision not to
join respected.90 However, in practice, U.S. policy has been more in line
with the advice of Undersecretary John Bolton, who as previously
mentioned is the architect of the government’s campaign against the Court.
In 1998 he said:
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We should isolate and ignore the ICC. Specifically, I propose for
United States policy—I have got a title for it . . . I call it the Three
Noes: no financial support, directly or indirectly; no collaboration;
and no further negotiations with other governments to improve the
Statute. . . . This approach is likely to maximize the chances that
the ICC will wither and collapse, which should be our objective.91
To implement this goal, the administration is waging an uncompromising
campaign against the Court with bilateral agreements and aggressive action
at the United Nations. The aim of both prongs of its attack is not only, or
even primarily, to keep Americans from coming before the Court, but to
weaken or destroy it by whittling away at its statutory authority and
undermining its legitimacy.
A. Bilateral Immunity Agreements
Since the Bush administration announced its intention to withdraw its
signature from the Rome Statute, it has been pressuring states to conclude
bilateral agreements that would prevent the surrender to the Court of any
American or U.S. employee. States parties that have refused to sign the
U.S. text have lost U.S.-funded military training and assistance. The
administration has justified this campaign by saying that it is mandated by
the American Servicemembers Protection Act (ASPA),92 which, among its
other provisions,93 requires these cuts for any ICC state party that has not
signed an agreement pursuant to Article 98 of the Rome Statute.94
However, it is widely agreed that the U.S. text does not accurately reflect
the requirments of that article. Furthermore, at the administration’s
insistence,95 the ASPA includes broad authority for the president to waive
cuts to any or all affected states.96 Moreover, administration threats have
reportedly gone beyond military funding to include assistance for projects
such as airport repairs and hurricane disaster relief.97
Since cuts were first threatened in July 2002, eighty-two countries have
reportedly signed the bilateral agreement with the United States, including
thirty-four ICC states parties.98 Many of these agreements are not yet
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binding because of opposition by the national parliaments that must adopt
them before they can enter into force. Originally thirty-four countries lost
funding; as of March 2004, over twenty states that are parties to the ICC
and have continued to refuse to sign the agreement have been cut off from
millions of dollars.99
The administration claims that its bilateral agreements are compatible
with the Rome Statute because they meet the requirements of Article 98(2).
That article provides:
[t]he Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its
obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the
consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that
State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation
of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.
The language in the U.S. agreement, however, goes beyond the wording of
that article. It has been widely noted that Article 98(2)’s explicit
requirement of a “sending state” relationship would only include
agreements pertaining to persons sent abroad on official government
business. For example, this could include Status of Forces or Status of
Mission agreements that require U.S. military or civilian personnel accused
of a crime to be returned to the United States for prosecution. The U.S.
text, however, applies to a much wider group of persons, including all U.S.
nationals and contractors who could even be citizens of an ICC-member
state.100 Commenting on the controversy over the U.S. text, David
Scheffer, the chief ICC negotiator for the Clinton administration has said:
[t]he negotiating objective never was to protect American
mercenaries or any other citizen engaged in unofficial actions. . . .
Rogue citizens act at their own risk. . . . It is worth recalling that
the original intent of Article 98 agreements was to ensure that
Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) between the United States
and scores of countries would not be compromised and that
Americans on offical duty could be specially covered by
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agreements that fit Article 98’s terms. I first put that requirment
on the table in early 1995 in Madrid.”101
It is almost universally agreed that joining one of these agreements
would violate a state party’s obligations to the Rome Statute.102 However,
the Bush administration has as of yet refused to amend its text to address
this concern. Nor has it responded to legal criticisms of it. In September
2003, Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs Lincoln Bloomfield
made the only known attempt to do so. He said that U.S. legal experts “find
support in the usage found in other conventions such as the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, whose use of the term sending state
refers to all persons who are nationals of the sending state.”103 However,
this argument is unconvincing because the Vienna Convention in fact goes
against the U.S. interpretation. Contrary to Mr. Bloomfield’s reading, the
term “sending state” is used throughout that convention in the context of
consular relations solely to indicate the state that sends government officials
abroad on official business—in this case as consular staff or officials.
Without more detailed legal analysis from the administration, it is difficult
to understand why it believes that the convention lends support to its
position.
B. U.S. Attacks at the United Nations
The first indication that the Bush administration intended to conduct a
campaign in the Security Council to undermine the Court was in June 2002,
when the United States stood alone in vetoing the Bosnian peacekeeping
mission mandate, a critical part of the international community’s multibillion dollar commitment to ensure long-term peace in the region. Bush
administration officials said that the United States would not approve an
extension of the Bosnian or any other mission unless international
peacekeepers on the ground were given permanent blanket immunity from
arrest and prosecution by the ICC.104
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Several factors indicated that this maneuver was not a genuine effort to
protect American troops but was a direct attack on the Court. First, while
the United States is one of the largest financial donors to UN peacekeeping,
it does not contribute a large number of troops. At the time of its veto it had
only forty-six personnel in Bosnia pursuant to the UN mandate, and these
were all part of the unarmed police force.105 Since the European Union was
already scheduled to take full control of the mission in a few months time,
some Security Council members suggested that the United States pull out
its affected troops and turn the mission over to the EU. The administration
refused. Second, U.S. urgency seemed misplaced since the ICC would not
be fully functioning for at least another year. Finally, as was pointed out at
the time by UN Secretary-General Annan, U.S. forces operating in the
former Yugoslavia had been under the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) since 1993 and none had ever
been indicted.106
Resolution 1422, a compromise text, was adopted unanimously after
many drafts and weeks of negotiation. Its operative language requests the
ICC not to investigate or seek the surrender of peacekeepers from non-state
parties for one year.107 The resolution attempts to track the requirements of
Article 16 of the Rome Statute, which authorizes the Security Council to act
under its Chapter VII peace and security authority to suspend any ICC
proceeding on a case-by-case basis for 12–month periods.108 However,
while that article merely authorizes the Security Council to stop an active
investigation or prosecution against a specific individual, Resolution 1422
seeks to prospectively prevent the ICC from taking up any case against an
entire class of person—all peacekeepers from non-states parties. It has
been argued that in addition to undermining the delicate balance of power
between the Court and the Council that was carefully negotiated in Article
16, the resolution also contravenes Article 27, which makes official
capacity irrelevant in the determination of criminal responsibility.109
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The United States position is that it is “consistent both with the terms of
Article 16 and with the primary responsibility of the Security Council for
maintaining peace and security for the Council to adopt such a resolution
with regard to the operations it authorizes or establishes.”110 The United
States’ UN Ambassador John Negroponte has said that it was “a practical
solution to both [U.S.] concerns and those of ICC States Parties.”111
When Resolution 1422 was adopted, member states such as Canada,
Brazil, New Zealand, and South Africa stated before the Security Council
that they believed it was unnecessary and contravened the Rome Statute.
They also said it may violate the UN Charter, since Security Council action
under Chapter VII requires a determination that a specific threat to
international peace and security exists.112 Prince Zeid Al-Hussein, Jordan’s
Permanent Representative to the UN and now the President of the ASP,
asked, “[h]ow could the Security Council adopt a Chapter VII resolution on
the Court, when the latter cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be
considered a threat to international peace and security?”113
In 2003, the Security Council passed—with three abstentions—
Resolution 1487, which renewed Resolution 1422 for an additional year.114
The text of Resolution 1487115 is identical to 1422. Before the vote, the
Secretary-General and representatives of close to sixty countries spoke out
against renewal. The Secretary-General said that in his view the resolution
was unnecessary and inappropriate, and that if it were to be continually
renewed, it could undermine not only the authority of the ICC, but also the
authority of the Security Council and the legitimacy of peacekeeping
operations.116
The renewal of Resolution 1487 in June 2004 will
undoubtably be hotly contested once again.
A few months after the controversy over Resolution 1487, the United
States held up the peacekeeping operation in Liberia until it secured a total
permanent exemption for personnel from non-state parties, both from the
ICC and from any foreign jurisdiction.117 Resolution 1497 both constricts
ICC jurisdiction and permanently restricts the ability of national courts to
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prosecute Liberian peacekeepers accused of committing atrocities against
their citizens.118 Considering the region’s long history of horrendous
violence and impunity, Resolution 1497 sends an extremely troubling
message about the equal application of the law.119
Similarly, in August 2003, the United States refused to support a
resolution protecting humanitarian aid workers solely because it referred to
the fact that the ICC has criminalized attacks against them as war crimes.
The only express U.S. objection was that the language was
“unnecessary.”120 The U.S. opposition continued even after the bombing in
Baghdad that killed twenty-two aid workers in the UN compound. The
version that passed instead stated indirectly that “there are existing
prohibitions under international law against attacks knowingly and
intentionally directed against personnel involved in humanitarian assistance
or peacekeeping mission[s] . . . .”121
The United States has used similar tactics in the UN General Assembly
(GA). In August 2003, the United States circulated a diplomatic note to
many UN delegations, asking them not to call for support of the ICC in GA
resolutions, especially when they involve human rights issues. In the GA,
however, where its intransigence cannot prevent an overwhelming number
of votes in support of the Court, the United States has been willing—after
ensuring that its objections are placed on the record—to allow formal
consensus on ICC language.122

VI. HOW THE BUSH POLICY HURTS U.S. INTERESTS
A. Harm to Allied Relations
Staunch allies of the United States are among the ICC’s current ninetyfour states parties, including all members of the European Union, all EU
aspirants (with the exception of Turkey), Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
South Korea, many African states, and most of South America. For many
of them, the Court is a major foreign policy priority. Leading ICC
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supporters such as Canada, which deploys many more peacekeepers around
the world than the United States, think that administration concerns are
overblown and that its war on the Court is disproportionate to any
perceived danger.123 Threats by the United States to end peacekeeping
missions and arm twisting on bilateral agreements have not gone over well
in foreign capitals and in many cases have renewed or exacerbated
differences over unrelated issues, such as the U.S. war in Iraq, the “war on
terrorism,” and trade policy.
In both Europe and in the Caribbean, where countries have been working
hard to establish regional foreign policies, the U.S. “divide and conquer”
approach has generated much bitterness. While the EU has remained
formally united against the bilateral agreement campaign, in the Caribbean,
favors for some countries and penalties for others have undermined unity
among CARICOM members.124 The United States has refused to
acknowledge these countries’ right to establish a common approach to the
Court and has in fact accused the EU of acting inappropriately in making
support for the Court and the integrity of the Rome Statute a requirement
for its member states.125 Frustrated by the the EU common policy opposing
bilateral agreements and its continued difficulties in convincing countries to
sign on, in June 2003 the administration took the extraordinary step of
warning that the impact on U.S.–EU relations would be “very damaging” if
the EU did not stop lobbying against the agreement .126
For many countries, the contradiction between the administration’s
policy toward the Court and the prominent U.S. role in pressuring the
Balkan countries to turn over indicted persons to the ICTY has not gone
unnoted. As a case in point, two weeks after requiring Serbia and
Montenegro to show that they were fully cooperating with the ICTY as a
prerequisite to receiving further U.S. assistance, Serbia’s military aid was
suspended because it refused to sign a bilateral agreement with the United
States. Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Zivkovic commented, “I think it
would be very difficult to explain to our people that on the one hand we
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will sign a bilateral agreement with the United States in which we agree to
protect their citizens, while at the same time we are arresting and
extraditing our citizens for trial at [the ICTY].”127 This contradictory
approach has encouraged a widespread perception that the United States is
engaging in blatant hypocrisy: that the administration believes international
justice is fine for others, but not for Americans.128
B. Harm to International Law and Justice
U.S. attacks on the Court are considered detrimental to both international
justice and international law. This is true both regarding specific actions
taken by the United States against the Court, and in the pattern of disregard
the administration has displayed for international obligations in general.
For instance, attempts to carve out exceptions from the ICC’s jurisdiction
are perceived as harmful because they raise questions about the equal
application of the law. It is feared that such exemptions will create a
double standard, whereby different categories of individuals are treated
differently. Because, as discussed above, ICC jurisprudence is accepted by
the U.S. government, a reasonable inference follows that U.S. demands for
immunity seek to place Americans above the law. In effect, the United
States is promoting the existence of “impunity gaps”—exactly what the
ICC was designed to prevent. If the U.S. policy continues unchallenged,
other states will expect to secure the same exemptions, and international
justice will become an ineffective patchwork of exceptions instead of a
uniform body of law.
The U.S. campaign has also raised questions about whether the Security
Council exceeded its authority in passing Resolutions 1422/1478 in the first
place. Some UN members view the adoption of those resolutions as a
craven abuse of the exceptional authority entrusted to that body by UN
member states. In addition to the Security Council’s failure to identify a
threat to peace and security as required by Chapter VII, some have
questioned whether the resolutions are an ultra vires attempt by that body to

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS & U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

The Counterproductive Bush Administration Policy Toward the ICC 373

amend a treaty. This could undermine state treaty-making authority, a
fundamental attribute of sovereignty.
The negative reception of these resolutions has thus called into question
the founding principle of the international legal order: the sovereign
equality of states. This obviously raises concerns far beyond the
resolutions’ effect on ICC jurisdiction. If Council powers were misused in
this instance, it could set a precedent for future abuse. As mentioned above,
even the Secretary-General has expressed concern about the effect on that
body’s continued credibility.
Ultimately, the U.S. campaign is perceived by many as an attempt to
reduce international law to an instrumentality instead of an obligation. This
is supported by remarks by Lincoln Bloomfield, a leading member of the
ICC policy team. In defending the U.S. policy he expressed his view that
“legal institutions and positions derive their legitimacy from the fidelity
with which they serve fundamentally political ends.”129
C. Harm to U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives
The dogmatism of the administration’s campaign has not gone
completely unnoticed in the United States. It has even generated some
concern in Washington. This is because its single-minded nature has at
times seemed self-defeating and more damaging to U.S. interests than to the
Court. As mentioned above, the United States derives tremendous benefits
from the existence of international law. It also benefits from its ability to
convince other states to accept its leadership. Both Republican Senator
Bennett and Democratic Senator Lieberman have commented on the
fractures the ICC policy has caused in the U.S. relationship with its allies.
Long before he began his campaign for president, Senator Lieberman
pointed out that
[o]ur friends and allies have reacted negatively to a number of
President Bush’s pronouncements and policies, including rejection
of . . . the International Criminal Court. . . . This vote [resulting in
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a loss of its seat on the UN Human Rights Commission for the first
time in over fifty years] clearly demonstrates that there can be
unanticipated and damaging consequences to our actions on the
world stage. The U.S. cannot take our friends for granted. . . .130
In practice, Congress has done little to ameliorate the effects of the
administration’s campaign, except in one notable case. Due to the
president’s refusal to waive NATO aspirant countries from ASPAmandated military assistance cuts, those countries suffered a six-month loss
of military assistance. As a result, these important allies lacked the funding
they needed to achieve the required preparedness to join NATO and to
assist U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.131 General Wesley Clark noted
that
[i]n Eastern Europe, there is dismay. These were some of the first
countries in the world to support the Bush Administration in Iraq.
And what does this administration do to its friends? In July, it
suspends all U.S. military assistance to Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia,
Slovakia, and Bulgaria because they have not yet promised
Americans blanket immunity from the International Criminal
Court. We even took away money for night vision goggles for
Baltic troops serving in Iraq alongside ours.132
Ultimately, a bill to exempt these countries was introduced in both the
House and the Senate.133 When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
unanimously approved the bill in November 2003, a conflict arose in the
State Department over how to handle the situation, since the uniform policy
up until that point had been not to waive any country that would not sign a
bilateral agreement. The issuance of Presidential Determination 2004-09,134
partially waiving cuts to these countries, was an attempt to preempt the
Congress on this issue. The situation is notable for being the first obvious
disagreement within the State Department over the damaging political
effects of the anti-ICC campaign, and for being the first and only time the
hard-liners failed to prevail.
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Despite this one narrow accommodation made to competing policy goals,
the anti-ICC campaign’s detrimental effects on U.S. interests continue
unabated. In addition to NATO enlargement and preparedness and building
cooperation for the “war” on terror and war in Iraq, significant objectives
undercut by the campaign include combating drug trafficking and
transnational crime, and strengthening local capacity to deploy
peacekeepers (and thus reducing reliance on the United States).
For example, Colombia, the only South American country to support the
war in Iraq and a major ally in the “drug war,” lost $5 million in funding in
the summer of 2003. Although Colombia was willing to prohibit the
extradition to the ICC of Americans in the country on official U.S. business
(including private defense contractors) as long guaranteed under a 1962
agreement, the administration would not grant it a waiver until it finally
capitulated and signed the U.S. text. At stake was over $100 million,
including money to supply an American-trained force designated to protect
from sabotage a main oil pipeline operated by a U.S. company.135
Even now, countries the United States directly relies on for the success of
U.S. foreign policy priorities are going without the funds they need to do
the job. Such countries include Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Paraguay,
Peru, Tanzania, Uruguay, Benin, Central African Republic, Lesotho, Mali,
Namibia, South Africa, Croatia, Barbados, Dominica, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. Crispin Gregoire, Dominica’s
ambassador to the UN, has said that the funding cuts will hurt the U.S. in
the longer term. He questions, “[i]s the U.S. still committed to the war on
drugs?”136 If these shortsighted actions continue, vital strategic interests far
more important than the phantom threat posed by the ICC may be
irreparably harmed.

VII. THE POLICY ALTERNATIVES: A BALANCED APPROACH
Even if one accepts the legitimacy of U.S. concerns about the Court,
there are better ways by which the government can promote and protect
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U.S. national interests. First, the administration must accept that it can
hinder, but cannot kill the Court. The ICC is too important to too many
states that have lived for too long with those who foment atrocities and are
never held to account. The U.S. government must accommodate itself to
these motives and the institution they have created, face up to the existence
of the Court, and formulate a constructive policy for dealing with it.
Now that the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act is law and the
Bush policy toward the Court has hardened, most in Washington think the
ICC is a dead issue—at least until there is a new administration. At the
moment it appears extremely unlikely that the United States would ever be
willing to accept the existence of the ICC as long as Bush is president. But
how likely is it that U.S. policy would change even if there was a change in
administration? It is doubtful that any U.S. president would immediately
call for ratification of the Rome Statute.137 Too much skepticism exists
throughout the political establishment, and too much opposition needs to be
overcome in Congress. Before an administration could even decide to
actively assist the Court, it would have to work with Congress to remove
standing funding restrictions that prevent U.S. cooperation.
However, a policy of peaceful coexistence is not out of reach. To
reassert U.S. influence and credibility at the Court, while at the same time
protecting U.S. interests, it would not be necessary to make a noisy shift in
policy. With little fanfare any administration could: (1) end the campaign
to undermine the Court; (2) adopt a “constructive engagement” approach by
participating as an observer in the work of the Assembly of States Parties;
and (3) cooperate with the ICC on a case-by-case basis when doing so is in
American interests.
A. Ending the Anti-ICC Campaign
A first step in the right direction would be to adopt a “neutral” policy
toward the ICC. This would entail ending the high costs of the anti-ICC
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campaign by terminating the relentless pursuit of bilateral agreements as
well as efforts to obtain immunity through the Security Council.
Ideally, a new administration would recognize that the many safeguards
in the ICC Statute make the bilateral agreement campaign unnecessary.
However, if it were skeptical of the Court or felt compelled to continue the
campaign for domestic political reasons, it could nevertheless take several
steps that would substantially reduce friction with U.S. allies and increase
the overall effectiveness of the campaign. First, it could end the aggressive
policy of threatening states with a wide variety of sanctions for noncompliance. States that aid the United States in achieving important foreign
policy goals could be given waivers from the ASPA in recognition of their
assistance and friendship. Most importantly, the administration could allow
negotiation on the text of the agreement so that states could address U.S.
concerns about protecting U.S. officials and soldiers from political
prosecutions, while at the same time upholding their obligations under the
Rome Statute.
Fundamentally, this would mean reducing the scope of the agreements to
persons sent by the United States to a country on official business. As a
consequence, they would cover primarily U.S. officials and
servicemembers. The administration should recognize and accept that it has
no interest in protecting a wider group of persons than those serving abroad
at its behest.
To ensure no immunity gap existed, all bilateral agreements would also
need to establish an absolute obligation for the United States to investigate
any persons who are returned to it in lieu of being surrendered to the Court.
Only with this added safeguard can such agreements both ensure primary
jurisdiction for the United States and uphold equality before the law. With
these modifications, the administration would find that many ICC states
parties would be more than happy to appease U.S. concerns by concluding
a non-surrender agreement.
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At the same time, the United States should stop pressing for Security
Council resolutions providing immunity to peacekeepers. This effort has
contributed little or nothing toward protecting Americans from the Court
but has generated an immense amount of concern and resentment.
Similarly, by no longer obstructing attempts to include language in
resolutions that appropriately and beneficially recognizes the jurisprudence
and authority of the ICC, the administration could regain credibility among
many nations that see its obstructive tactics as an affront to their
sovereignty and a threat to the UN’s consensus based culture.
B. Participating As an Observer in the Assembly of States Parties
A second step in reasserting U.S. influence at the ICC would be for the
United States to take up its seat as an observer in the Assembly of States
Parties. It is entitled to do so at any time, with no legal obligation
attaching. The United States regularly uses observer status to participate in
treaty bodies that it has not joined, and often attends with one of the largest
delegations. It is an important means whereby the administration could
keep abreast of the activities of the Court. It could also participate in all
debates and negotiations on the same basis as any state party. The only
difference between this status and Court membership is that an observer is
unable to vote. Consequently, if the United States regained its credibility in
the field of international justice by ending its campaign to undermine the
Court as discussed above, it could likely have a major impact on the shape
and outcome of ASP discussions.
If the U.S. government is truly concerned that the ICC is a potential
threat to U.S. interests, it is hard to understand what possible justification it
has for not keeping engaged with the Court to ensure it does not veer off
track. In this respect it is significant that the United States is the only major
state not currently participating in the ASP as either a state party or an
observer. Thus, observer states include China, India, Japan, and Russia.
While Israel followed the U.S. lead in nullifying its signature on the Rome
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Statute, it nevertheless stays involved in the Court’s work by exercising its
right to observer status.
C. Cooperating with the Court When It Is in U.S. Interests
Finally, an administration should remain ready to cooperate with the
Court when it is U.S. national interests. This is not only pragmatic; it was
the intent of the Congress when it incorporated the Dodd Amendment into
the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act. That section reads:
Nothing in this title shall prohibit the United States from rendering
assistance to international efforts to bring to justice Saddam
Hussein, Slobodan Milosovic, Osama bin Laden, other members of
Al Queda, leaders of Islamic Jihad, and other foreign nationals
accused of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.138
This mandate can be fulfilled by staying involved in the work of the Court,
turning over all atrocity evidence that is uniquely within the knowledge or
control of the U.S. government, and encouraging the Security Council to
refer cases to the Court that would otherwise be outside of its jurisdictional
authority.

VIII. CONCLUSION
Since the Bush administration announced its policy on the ICC, serious
debate on the Court in the United States has come to a screeching halt.
During that time, the ICC has been staffed and begun operations. The first
two investigations are poised to begin. Rules and regulations have been
written, and procedures developed—all without the input of the U.S.
government. These missed opportunities cannot be restored, yet new
opportunities continue to be ignored. Partly, this is the fault of ICC
supporters. They seem to have accepted the frame drawn by Court
opponents, who view U.S. options in uncompromising terms: either
ratification or complete disengagement; either the United States submits its
citizens to the caprice of foreign judges, or it rejects the Court out of hand.
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This narrow perspective forecloses much needed discussion on the value of
the Court to the United States and the cost of the administration’s policy.
Furthermore, it disregards prudent policy options currently available to our
government.
Slow and careful steps to build bridges between the United States and
Court would add up to a marked and much welcome change in U.S.
credibility and influence on this issue. Moreover, they could lay the
foundation for an eventual active and supportive role in the work of the
Court. This should be a goal supported by all Americans. Forgotten in the
acrimony over the ICC is the uniform commitment by all U.S.
administrations to end impunity for atrocities and maintain U.S. leadership
in international justice.
The existence of the Court is compelling the Bush administration to
repeatedly confront and justify its uncompromising policy toward the ICC.
This is most apparent in the decisions that it is being forced to make about
whether to cut the military funding of some of its closest allies. It is also
apparent at the Security Council, where over a few short months last year
the United States expended a great deal of time and effort by holding
peacekeeping and humanitarian initiatives hostage to satisfy the narrow
ideological concerns of a small minority in the government. For now, the
administration remains willing to expend large amounts of limited political
capital in its quixotic war on the Court. Instead of using its influence to
ensure that the ICC grows into a fair and effective institution, the United
States, alone among the great powers, has left its chair at the Court empty.
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